Behind the confrontation between China and the United States is the contest between political models and governance models.
Release date – Saturday, July 23 at 12:30
Emmanuel Veron
Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on June 18-19, his first since Mike Pompeo’s in 2018, was aimed at starting a “diplomatic thaw” with Beijing. , and to “maintain” communication channels to responsibly manage U.S.-China relations. If all regional and global strategic issues are resolved, the visit did not (unsurprisingly) bring about a real thaw.
Beijing is now a strategic priority for Washington, and vice versa. Structural tensions are felt across all domains (economic, military, technological and diplomatic). Bilateral relations have not been this bad since the Cold War.
interdependence and hostility
The continued deterioration of bilateral relations is indisputable; however, 2022 has set a record high for Sino-US trade. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic and heightened tensions in Asia, particularly around Taiwan, and of course the war in Ukraine as a backdrop, this year alone is close to $700 billion in transactions.
While the Obama administration sought to maintain an “appropriate distance” from Beijing and opted for “strategic restraint” more broadly, the Trump administration has greatly accelerated the concretization of the balance of power in the areas of trade, technology, military and security.
The Biden administration (probably the first president who has not visited China since the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in the early 1970s) pursues a policy of containing China to contain and counter its growing influence.
Against this backdrop, how do we explain 2022’s record number of transactions?
In his 2008 book “The Rise of Money,” historian Niall Ferguson showed how the Chinese (mostly urban dwellers) saved money for Americans in the form of national debt. These are used to buy products made in China.
Despite some adjustments (the famous “decoupling”), the interdependence has only increased over time, including the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis on the one hand and the Covid-19 crisis on the other. Remember, China is still the second largest holder of US debt.
Economic interdependence has become one of the most decisive factors in Sino-US relations. It is gradually expanding to all areas – industrial and financial, but also strategic. The example of Taiwan illustrates this well: if Taiwan blocks, the supply chain consequences will affect the entire world.
American model
A closer look shows that Sino-US relations are becoming more and more complicated, which is the result of the increasing interdependence and mutual understanding we just mentioned. Structurally, each step of a step is a test of the other step.
Chinese stratospheric hot air balloon over U.S. territory, Blinken claims in Beijing that China won’t supply arms to Russia at war with Ukraine, China sets up listening post in Cuba, EU ties including arbitration over China’s 5G or geo-economic fragmentation – against China, China’s invasion of Taiwan’s sea and airspace, etc.Most importantly, both Beijing and Washington pay close attention to every issue
Vulnerabilities of others: economy, unemployment, social imbalances.
On the one hand, a U.S. government polarized by the war in Ukraine, continued exposure to “Indo-Pacific affairs,” and the complexities of multilateralism must choose its priorities; Emerging and developing countries.
Since the inception of President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, the United States has intensified its rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region. On the American side, during this period, we forged or strengthened alliances, notably through Quad and AUKUS.
Outside the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. model itself is the subject of wider controversy. Beijing is determined to discredit the liberal democratic model and the American power behind it. For the People’s Republic of China, it is a matter of modifying the post-1945 international environment (international law, norms and standards, perceptions in the physiological sense) to “sinicize” it.
In short, behind the confrontation between China and the United States is the contest between political models and governance models. China pursues a strategy of confusion and attrition towards the United States. We can distinguish two main axes: first weaving a web of asymmetric relations and dependencies, and then modifying the post-1945 international environment (international law, norms and standards, perceptions in a physiological sense) to make it “sinicized” and dominant status.
Impossible G2…
If in the 2000s some observers proposed that the future of world governance would be governed by the G2 China and the US, two undisputed powers that “jointly govern” the planet, today this assumption has been overshadowed by China’s desire for domination and coercion destroy.
Blinken’s visit made some very relative progress (notably points of discussion on maintaining the relationship between the two great men outside the strict strategic-military framework), covering a variety of topics, including cooperation to protect the environment and climate, Fentanyl trafficking or the fate of three Americans imprisoned in China. But the hurdles remain many and serious: Beijing remains inflexible on Taiwan and refuses to re-establish high-level contacts between Chinese and American military officials. On the last point, let us recall that General Lee Sang-bok, who is on the US sanctions list, was recently appointed as the Minister of Defense.
A four-day visit by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in early July did nothing to reverse the trend. Her arrival, coming against a backdrop of tensions, especially in semiconductors, is first and foremost an opportunity for her to reiterate her desire for “healthy competition” between the two countries.
We should also note that Beijing appears to be increasingly separating public diplomacy from the primary role (visits by Bill Gates, Elon Musk, etc.) important participants. Geoeconomics is a frequently used lever in diplomacy. At this point, the confrontation between China and the United States is not a typical (political-military) confrontation, but a confrontation between the two parties trying to gain the upper hand through economic development, innovation and political model competition.
While NATO will set up a liaison office in Japan, the alliance’s Vilnius summit echoed the Ukrainian front, a sign that NATO is increasingly integrating the possibility of opening a front in Asia – a prospect both Beijing and Washington fear, But both sides think it’s doable. (theconversation.com)
