Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere
Posted Date – Fri, 3/24/23 at 12:45am
Ronald Sonny
Hyderabad: Days after being listed as a war criminal on an international arrest warrant, Russian President Vladimir Putin is negotiating peace with his most important ally, Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The meeting place was the late 15th-century Polyhedron, the ornate throne room of Moscow’s grand dukes and tsars. The main topic of discussion was huge: How should hostilities in Ukraine end? After the war, how should the international security system be reshaped?
The reaction of many in the West to the proposals made by China and discussed with Russia was markedly skeptical of its intentions. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned the world not to be “fooled by any tactical move by Russia, backed by China … to freeze the war on its own terms”.
The sentiment is understandable. Putin has waged a brutal, unprovoked war in Ukraine. In an environment of heightened emotions such as missile strikes against civilians, horrific atrocities against ordinary citizens and the expulsion of children from Ukraine, even a sober assessment by the belligerents of how to end the fighting, declare a ceasefire and begin negotiations invites accusations of appeasement . The peace plan, proposed by China on February 24, 2023 and discussed with Putin during their March 20-22 meeting in Moscow, was criticized for being too vague and lacking concrete proposals.
In such circumstances, it is difficult to consider what the other party’s real interest in ending the killing is, and whether they have the sincerity to do so. But as a historian, I ask, what is it like to see the world from the other side? How do Russia and China understand the preparatory stages of war and the war itself? What does the post-conflict world envisioned by Xi Jinping and Putin look like?
Rules – but whose?
The rulers of both Russia and China see the Western-dominated “rules-based international order” — the system that has dominated geopolitics since the end of World War II — as designed to preserve U.S. global hegemony. The two expressed a preference for a multilateral system, which is likely to produce some regional hegemony. To be sure, this will include Chinese and Russian dominance in their own neighbourhoods.
Xi Jinping expressed the issue mildly during his trip to Moscow: “The international community has realized that no country is superior to others, no model of governance is universal, and no country can arbitrarily enforce the international order. The common The interest lies in a world of unity and peace, not division and instability.”
Reflecting his more street-tough style, Putin is more forthright. Russia and China, he said, “have always argued for a more just multipolar world order based on international law, rather than certain ‘rules’ that serve the needs of a ‘golden billion’,” citing a theory that the world Over one billion people, the richest countries in the world consume the largest portion of the world’s resources.
Putin continued on this line of thinking, stating that the “Ukrainian crisis” is an example of the West’s attempt to “maintain its international dominance and maintain a unipolar world order” while “splitting the common Eurasian space into ‘exclusive clubs’ and military networks”. Groups that will help curb the development of our country and harm their interests. “
China is a peacemaker?
Beijing appears intent on playing the role of chief negotiator in the transition to a multipolar world order. After successfully ditching the US and brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has turned its attention to Ukraine.
With its peace proposal to Ukraine, China has deftly established certain principles that other countries will eagerly endorse. “The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively safeguarded. All countries, regardless of size, strength, wealth or poverty, are equal members of the international community.
But those bland sentences point in two directions at once. A year after Russia so clearly violated the sovereignty of neighboring Ukraine, asserting sovereignty may seem at first glance to be directed against Russia. But the principle can also be understood to include the conflict over Taiwan, which Beijing and some other countries recognize as part of China. The wording of the plan is perhaps no accident as the United States, which formally recognizes China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, has stepped up its stance and vowed to defend the island if Taiwan is invaded. For Beijing, the United States appears intent on turning rival China into an enemy.
China insists that countries have the right to enhance their own security, but not at the expense of others. This principle directly echoes one of Putin’s most frequently expressed reasons for the conflict with Ukraine: NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, and the alliance’s commitment to expand further by including Georgia and Ukraine. In Putin’s view, such NATO aggression is an existential threat to Russia’s security interests. But China’s plan also rejects Putin’s threat of nuclear force: “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.”
At the same time, the Chinese strongly insisted on the need for an immediate ceasefire and the start of negotiations, a call that Washington strongly rejected, arguing that such concessions amounted to “diplomatic cover for Russia to continue to commit war crimes”.
russian target
Russia’s objectives in the Ukraine war are simple enough to dissect, though they have dwindled after Ukraine effectively resisted the initial invasion. Instead of taking over all of Ukraine and installing a puppet government, Moscow has been forced to accept limited territorial gains in the Donbass and the coastal crescent linking the region and Russia to Crimea.
These Russian goals, though reduced, are completely unacceptable to Ukraine and the Western alliance—indeed, to all countries that accept the principle that international borders cannot be unilaterally and legally changed by military force. unacceptable.
Although not explicitly stated, this principle is even included in the first sentence of China’s peace plan: “Recognized international law must be strictly observed, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Intervention and the program are welcome.
Rival global ambitions
Given that the peace plan is no longer viable for many, what does it mean for Beijing? The conflict in Ukraine has not only been devastating to the two warring nations involved, but has also destabilized countries around the world. In the short term, China may benefit from this war, as it drains the West’s attention and armaments, and diverts its attention away from East Asia. America’s “pivot east” — a planned refocus since the Obama administration to counter the Chinese threat — has stalled.
But there is an argument that Xi Jinping is most concerned with the recovery of China’s economic development, which will depend on reducing confrontational relations with Europe and the United States. Domestic and international stability contributes to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. Beijing has noted that a slump in foreign demand and investment is hurting the country’s economic outlook.
So Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere. Moreover, Xi Jinping may be the only person in the world who can convince Putin to seriously consider a way out of war.
However, it is not only the current intransigence of Russia and Ukraine that stands in the way of peace. The United States’ longstanding foreign policy goal of maintaining its status as an “indispensable nation” runs counter to Russia’s and China’s ambitions to end U.S. global dominance.
It presents two seemingly insurmountable competing ambitions.
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